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FEDERALISM ISSUES RELATED TO THE PROBABLE
EMERGENCE OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES
CONTROL ACT
JIM FLORIO*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines how the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA) affects the regulation of chemical substances at the state level.
Emphasis is placed on TSCA's preemption over local laws, particularly
in the context of regulations of Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs).
While federalism issues have not been a major part of TSCA analysis,
there has been recent congressional interest in making TSCA a more
"effective," and thereby more expansive, law. In fact, the United
States General Accounting Office released a report in September 1994
outlining several legislative changes that could expand TSCA's regula-
tory control.' Moreover, the New Jersey state legislature is consider-
ing changes in the Pollution Prevention Act, the act which regulates
the use of toxic substances in New Jersey.2
Having served as a Congressman during TSCA's enactment and
then having attempted, as the Governor of the State of New Jersey, to
abide by this federal mandate, I can appreciate the conflict embodied
in TSCA. This law pits a federal environmental regulation against a
state's interest in protecting the economic and social welfare of its
residents.
A. General TSCA Discussion
The Toxic Substances Control Act' was enacted by Congress in
1976 to "regulate commerce and protect health and the environment
by requiring testing and necessary restrictions on certain chemical
* Partner in the New Jersey office of Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander & Ferdon;
Governor of the State of New Jersey, 1990 to 1994; United States Congressman, 1974 to
1990. I was assisted in preparing this Article by Glenn A. Clouser and Fernando E.
Linhares, both Environmental Associates at the NewJersey office of Mudge, Rose, Guthrie,
Alexander & Ferdon.
1. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFcE, Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACr: LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES COULD MAKE THE AcT MORE EFFECTIVE (1994) [hereinafter GAO].
2. A. 903/S. 308 (1995). On January 23, 1995, the State Assembly passed bill A. 903,
which would curtail the Pollution Prevention Act, by a margin of 50 to 30. The Senate
version, S. 308, will be considered by the Senate Environmental Committee.
3. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 260 1-
2692 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The Act, referred to as TSCA, was originally enacted on
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substances."4 Specifically, TSCA regulates the manufacture, use, and
disposal of chemicals that pose a significant risk of injury to the envi-
ronment and human health. TSCA has been referred to as "perhaps
the most complex, confusing, and ineffective of all our federal envi-
ronmental protection statutes."'
1. Historical Developments 1970-1976.---Commencing with the en-
actment of the National Environmental Policy Act 6 and the creation
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), both of which oc-
curred in 1970, Congress passed several major pieces of environmen-
tal legislation prior to TSCA.' Congress enacted TSCA, in part, to
remedy the lack of health and safety information concerning chemi-
cal substances and mixtures and to prevent unreasonable risk of injury
to human health and the environment from harmful chemicals.8
Thus, TSCA authorizes EPA "to collect information about the hazards
posed by chemical substances and to take action to control unreasona-
ble risks by either preventing dangerous chemicals from making their
way into use or placing restrictions on those already in commerce."'
Because TSCA "does not clearly articulate what EPA is to achieve
through the use of its regulatory authorities," 10 there has been a con-
tinuing debate between regulators and the regulated community as to
whether TSCA is intended to be a comprehensive, umbrella law or an
attempt at filling gaps left by other health and environmental laws."
October 11, 1976, and became effective onJanuary 1, 1977. Regulations promulgated pur-
suant to the Act are found at 40 C.F.R. Parts 702 through 775.
4. H.R. REP. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
5. ZYGMUNTJ.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLIcy 748 (1992).
6. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
7. Prior to TSCA's enactment, the following regulatory laws were in effect: Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136g (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(enacted in 1972); Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) (enacted in 1972); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) (enacted in 1973); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-671a
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (enacted in 1970); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (enacted in 1972); Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (enacted in 1972); Public
Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (enacted in 1974);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671g (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (enacted in 1970); and the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(enacted in 1976).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 2601.
9. GAO, supra note 1, at 9.
10. Id. at 15.
11. Id.
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2. The "Gap-Filler" Objective.--Comments in the Senate Report
on TSCA provide an excellent illustration of congressional intent in
enacting TSCA. 1' According to the Senate,
[T] he proposed Toxic Substances Control Act would close a
number of major regulatory gaps, for while certain statutes...
may be used to protect health and the environment from
chemical substances, none of these statutes provide the
means for discovering adverse effects on health and environ-
ment before manufacture of new chemical substances.13
Therefore, in light of the fragmented and inadequate federal
programs protecting against the adverse effects of toxic chemicals,
TSCA was meant to "fill the gap" by preventing the introduction of
unreasonably hazardous chemical substances into commerce.' 4 Be-
cause of TSCA's gap-filling approach, its goals are accomplished in
conjunction with other federal environmental laws. Thus, issues of
preemption and federalism are often obfuscated or limited by the ex-
pansive nature of the other applicable environmental law. In many
instances, EPA or the courts will choose to regulate chemical sub-
stances under environmental laws other than TSCA.
For instance, under TSCA section 9, EPA is authorized to refer a
matter to another agency if that agency would prevent or reduce the
risk of injury to a sufficient extent.' 5 EPA may also transfer a matter
for regulation under other EPA administered laws.'I An analogous
situation occurred in Sed, Inc. v. City of Dayton. 7 In Sed, a company
storing PCBs in its warehouse challenged the constitutionality of Day-
ton's ordinances restricting storage of PCBs, arguing that TSCA pre-
empted local regulation of toxic chemicals.' The court, however,
found that TSCA preemption was not an issue because the locality
enacted its ordinance under the authority of the Clean Water Act,
which permitted such local regulation.' 9
12. See generally S. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
13. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
14. See H.1L REP. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-7 (1976).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 2608.
16. See id.
17. 519 F. Supp. 979 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
18. Id. at 981.
19. See id. at 991. Additionally, state courts have struck down local ordinances, citing
preemption by comprehensive state laws governing hazardous waste, particularly in regard
to PCB disposal. See Envirosafe Serv. of Idaho, Inc. v. City of Owykee, 735 P.2d 998, 1003-
04 (Idaho 1987); Rollins Environmental Servs., Inc. v. Township of Logan, 508 A.2d 271,
272-73 (N.J. Super CL, App. Div. 1986) (finding defendant's argument that Congress
granted to states and municipalities authority to ban PCBs "clearly without merit"); Marc
W. Trost, The Regulation of Polychlorinated Biphenyls Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 31
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3. Umbrella Objective.-Because there is arguably much latitude
under TSCA to regulate chemical substances during the premanufac-
ture, manufacture, use and disposal stages, Congress should revisit the
issue of TSCA's scope.2" The chemical industry's continued growth
and the inherent benefits of regulating industrial chemicals during
production, use and disposal 1 also increases the likelihood that Con-
gress will redefine TSCA's scope in the foreseeable future. The 1994
GAO report on TSCA concurred, concluding that legislation chang-
ing TSCA to an umbrella environmental law would better and more
fully utilize EPA's authority over chemicals from production to
disposal."
Of course, the primary reason why federalism has not been an
issue under TSCA is the statute's "gap-filling" character. If TSCA is
expanded into an umbrella law, it is likely that the express preemp-
tion provision of TSCA section 18 will be more readily enforced and
federalism issues will be more clearly delineated. Under section 18, a
state or locality is preempted from regulating chemical substances if
the state or locality plans to establish or retain any requirement for
testing chemical substances or mixtures that is similar to a require-
ment promulgated under section 4 of TSCA.23 Moreover, a state or
locality is preempted from establishing or retaining a rule regulating
chemical substances or mixtures that are subject to EPA regulation
under section 5 or section 6 of TSCA unless the state or local law is
identical to the EPA prescribed requirement, the law is adopted pur-
suant to another federal law, or it prohibits the end use of such sub-
stances or mixtures in that state or political subdivision.24
A.F. L. REv. 117, 127 (1989) (collecting cases). With an expanded TSCA, EPA likely will
deal with more of these issues and delegate its authority with less regularity.
20. Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.), former chairperson of the Environmental and Public
Works Committee, which deals with toxic substances issues, had planned to propose legis-
lative discussion directed at reforming TSCA during the fall of 1994. TSCA Reform Bill
Would Revamp "Antique" Statute, EPA Officials Said, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 140 (July
6, 1994). However, a bill was never proposed. In fact, no major environmental legislation
was enacted during the last Congress.
21. This comprehensive regulation is frequently referred to as "cradle to grave"
legislation.
22. 7SCA Might Be Better as "Umbrella" Statute, GAO Tells Congress in Report Criticizing EPA,
Toxics L Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 661 (Nov. 16, 1994). The GAO also noted that EPA has
only issued regulations on 9 chemicals in 18 years. See GAO, supra note 1, at 15. As an
example of EPA's sporadic utilization of TSCA and that agency's view that TSCA is
subordinate to other laws, the GAO report noted that asbestos regulation is accomplished
through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Id. at 15.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (2) (A).
24. Id. Section 18 of TSCA establishes a procedure through which a state or locality
may petition EPA for an exemption for those situations where preemption would apply.
See id. § 2617(b).
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II. ASSESSING CHEMICALS UNDER TSCA
EPA regulates chemicals under TSCA through a variety of mecha-
nisms. Section 4 authorizes the EPA Administrator to establish regula-
tions that govern the testing of chemical substances and mixtures.25
These regulations assess the risk that chemicals may pose to health
and the environment. TSCA also establishes premanufacture notifica-
tion requirements for new chemical substances26 and for significant
new uses of existing substances;27 the regulation of hazardous chemi-
cal substances and mixtures which pose an imminent hazard;2" the
reporting and retention of information, including an inventory of
chemical substances; 9 and regulation of the import and export of
toxic substances.3 0 Thus, TSCA is designed and intended to protect
public health and the environment from hazardous chemicals at all
commercial stages, from premanufacture to disposal.3 1
According to the GAO report, approximately 72,000 substances
are in EPA's inventory of TSCA chemicals and 62,000 of these sub-
stances "were already in commerce when EPA began to review new
chemicals in 1979." 12 Because the compilation of data on chemical
substances is both costly and time consuming, EPA has managed to
review the risks of only about two percent of these 62,000 chemicals.5 3
Additionally, "more than 7 million chemicals are in existence, and ap-
proximately 80,000 of them are in common use worldwide ... [and]
about a thousand new chemicals are developed and added to the in-
ventory each year. " '4 Because TSCA permits comprehensive regula-
tion of these chemical substances and given that the chemical industry
25. Id. § 2603.
26. Id. § 2603(g).
27. Id. § 2604.
28. Id. §§ 2605-2606.
29. Id. § 2607.
30. Id. §§ 2611-2612.
31. Id. § 2601. TSCA also has a provision regarding the manufacturer's right of confi-
dentiality. Id. § 2613. Section 2613 protects from disclosure any confidential business in-
formation, such as trade secrets and privileged financial data. Id. Nevertheless, health and
safety studies that have been submitted under the Act may be subject to disclosure,
although in limited circumstances. Id. § 2613(b). Additionally, EPA employees are subject
to criminal sanctions for the willful disclosure of confidential business information. Id.
§ 2613(d). This right of confidentiality may be curtailed in the future. The GAO report
proposes making "TSCA's information on chemical risks publicly available by reducing the
amount of information that the industry claims as confidential." GAO, supra note 1, at 2.
32. GAO, supra note 1, at 2.
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id. at 8.
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is among the largest industries in the United States,35 TSCA's regula-
tory emergence and expansion is likely.
III. CONTROLLING CHEMICALS
A. Regulation of Harmful Chemicals
EPA is empowered to take a wide variety of regulatory actions
under TSCA section 6.36 First, however, EPA must show that there is a
reasonable basis to conclude that a chemical substance or mixture
"presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to human
health or the environment."37 Upon that showing, EPA can restrict or
prohibit the manufacture or distribution in commerce of such a sub-
stance or mixture;38 regulate the manner of disposal of the substance
or mixture;39 or impose quality control procedures,40 in addition to
several other regulatory options.41
B. Excluded Chemicals
Chemical substances are defined to include "any organic or inor-
ganic substance of a particular molecular identity, including: (1) any
combination of such substances occurring in whole or in part as a
result of a chemical reaction or occurring in nature and (2) any ele-
ment or uncombined radical."4' This expansive definition is subject
to only a few exclusions. For example, TSCA does not regulate to-
bacco and tobacco products; 43 source material, special nuclear mate-
rial, or byproduct material;4" firearms and ammunition;" or foods,
food additives, drugs, cosmetics, or devices, when manufactured,
processed, or distributed in commerce for use as a food, food addi-
tives, drugs, cosmetics, or devices.' TSCA also does not regulate pes-
ticides.4 7 Pesticides are defined in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
35. Id. The United States chemical production industry employs approximately
850,000 workers in manufacturing, and boasts $85 million in chemical sales. Id.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 2605.
37. Id. § 2605(a).
38. Id. § 2605(a)(1).
39. Id. § 2605(a) (6) (A).
40. Id. § 2605(b).
41. See id. § 2605(a).
42. Id. § 2602(2) (A).
43. Id. § 2602(2) (B)(iii).
44. Id. § 2602(2) (B)(iv).
45. See id. § 2602(2)(B)(v) (exempting such items subject to taxes imposed by § 4181
of the Internal Revenue Code).
46. Id. § 2602(2) (B)(vi).
47. Id. § 2602(2) (B) (ii).
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and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)48 and are exempted if the chemical sub-
stance is "manufactured, processed, or distributed in commerce for
use [solely] as pesticides."49 Pesticides will be subject to TSCA regula-
tions until "their manufacturers or importers demonstrate an intent
to create a pesticide by submitting an application for an experimental
use permit... or an application for registration under [FIFRA]."°
C. TSCA's Inventory Under TSCA Section 8
Under TSCA section 8 (b), EPA is to "compile, keep current, and
publish a list of each chemical substance which is manufactured or
processed in the United States."51 The initial TSCA Chemical Sub-
stance Inventory was published on June 1, 1979 and included about
62,000 chemicals.52 TSCA empowers EPA to require that the chemi-
cal industry maintain records and submit reports necessary for compi-
lation of the chemical substance inventory.5"
TSCA section 8(c) requires that any entity which "manufactures,
processes, or distributes in commerce any chemical substance or mix-
ture shall maintain records of any significant adverse reactions to
human health or the environment... alleged to have been caused by
[exposure to] the substance or mixture."54 Section 8(e) requires the
immediate reporting of information that can reasonably support the
conclusion that a chemical substance or mixture "presents a substan-
tial risk of injury to health or the environment. " "
D. Test Rules Under TSCA Section 4
TSCA requires the testing of new and existing chemical sub-
stances or mixtures that may present an unreasonable risk to health or
the environment if available data on such substances or mixtures is
inadequate to determine the risk.5 6 This review process is set forth in
48. See 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1988) (defining a pesticide as "(1) any substance or mixture
of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or instigating any pest, and
(2) any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant,
or desiccant").
49. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2) (B) (ii).
50. Toxic Substances; Revisions of Premanufacture Notification Regulations, 51 Fed.
Reg. 15,096, 15,098 (1986).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(b).
52. GAO, supra note 1, at 11. The initial TSCA inventory was supplemented on Novem-
ber 9, 1979, by substances which were reported too late for inclusion in the June inventory.
44 Fed. Reg. 28,558, 65,180 (1979).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2).
54. Id. § 2607(e).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 2603(a).
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detail under TSCA section 4(a) and includes several mandatory levels
of testing and corresponding findings.57 Upon completion of the re-
view process, and a corresponding finding of potential adverse envi-
ronmental and health effects, EPA will order testing and issue a rule
requiring the manufacturer to specify the form of testing, and upon
approval, to perform that testing." Testing pursuant to section 4(a)
has been quite extensive.
Over the years, EPA has made significant progress in devel-
oping testing programs for existing chemicals under Section
4. EPA has issued detailed regulations governing develop-
ment of test rules, negotiation of enforceable testing consent
agreements, and compliance with testing requirements
under test rules and consent orders. The Agency also has
developed regulations governing laboratory practices, test
methodologies, and the sharing of test costs for Section 4
rules. Several thousand chemicals have been screened for
possible testing, and considerable testing has been com-
pleted or is underway on many chemicals. 9
The testing of chemical substances or mixtures may scrutinize
health and environmental effects, such as carcinogenesis, chronic tox-
icity, behavioral disorders, cumulative effects or synergistic effects, or
other effects that may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health
or the environment.60 EPA sets the standards for the tests and the
manufacturers and processors of chemical substances or mixtures
have the burden of performing the required tests in accordance with
either a consent agreement or applicable testing regulations.61
EPA has established detailed procedures for implementing test-
ing consent agreements. 62 The purpose of the consent agreement is
to offer all affected parties, including manufacturers, processors, and
the relevant public, an opportunity to develop a consensus and enter
into an enforceable testing consent agreement. 65 The consent agree-
ment serves to establish procedural safeguards similar to those estab-
57. Id.
58. Id. § 2603(a)(2). The finding is satisfied if "the manufacture, distribution in com-
merce, processing, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture... may present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." Id. § 2603 (a) (1) (A) (i).
59. Carolyne R. Hathaway et al., A Practitioner's Guide to the Toxic Substances Control Act,
24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,207, 10,208 (May 1994). For an exhaustive overview of
TSCA and its regulatory program I refer the reader to this ELR three-part series on TSCA.
60. Id. at 10,209-13.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b) (3) (B).
62. Procedures Governing Testing Consent Agreements and Test Rules, 40 C.F.R.
§ 790.20 to .39 (1993).
63. Id. § 790.1(c).
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lished by the rule.' Some of the procedures EPA follows when
negotiating, formulating, and accepting consent agreements include
public notice, negotiation with affected parties, circulation of meeting
minutes and testing proposals, and upon reaching a consensus, publi-
cation in the Federal Register.65
EPA allows exemption from a test rule under limited condi-
tions.66 As with testing consent agreements, EPA also has promul-
gated detailed regulations for pursuing the exemption from test
rules.6 7 An exemption will be allowed if the chemical substance or
mixture proposed is equivalent to a substance already tested under a
TSCA section 4 test rule; in such a case, further testing would be du-
plicative.6" EPA denies exemption applications when the applicant
fails to meet approval requirements" or has failed to perform a test
rule obligation.7" Judicial review is available within sixty days after the
date of the promulgation of a rule under TSCA section 4(a).7
IV. PREMANUFACTURE AND NEW USE ISSUES: TSCA SECTION 5
Manufacturers of new chemical substances and manufacturers
and processors of existing chemical substances earmarked for signifi-
cant new uses must notify EPA ninety days before proceeding with the
manufacture or processing of such substances.72 The notification
must include the chemical identity and structure of the substance.
Additionally, the manufacturer or processor must disclose the pro-
posed uses, production volumes, anticipated byproducts, and other
facts that EPA may require.73 EPA may limit the production or even
prohibit the manufacture, processing, or distribution of a chemical
substance that presents-or that, in the absence of sufficient informa-
tion, may present-an unreasonable risk of injury to human health or
64. Id. § 790.1(b).
65. Id. § 790.22(b)(1); see also Hathaway et al., supra note 59, at 10,295-97.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(c).
67. 40 C.F.R. § 790.80 to .99.
68. Id. § 790.87(a).
69. Id. § 790.87(a)(1).
70. Id. § 790.88(a).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a) (1) (A). Judicial review is also available under other TSCA sec-
tions. See id. §§ 2604(a)(2), 2604(b)(4), 2605(a), 2605(e), 2607; see also id.
§ 2618(a) (1)(A) ("[Any person may file a petition forjudicial review of such rule with the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or the circuit in which
such person resides or in which such person's principal place of business is located."). A
court reviewing a rule promulgated under § 4(a) will uphold the rule if the rule-making
record is supported by substantial evidence. Id. § 2618(c).
72. Id. § 2604(a)(1).
73. Id. § 2604(a) (2).
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the environment."' A substance is considered a new chemical sub-
stance, and therefore subject to regulation under section 5, if it is not
included in the public or confidential inventory of chemical sub-
stances compiled by EPA pursuant to TSCA section 8(b).11 Use of an
inventory-listed chemical is not a significant new use unless EPA has
promulgated a regulation that identifies specific uses for a particular
chemical substance or category of chemical substances and the
planned use of the chemical varies from the listed uses.7 6
During the initial ninety-day review period, EPA must evaluate
the proposed new chemical substance, or new use of the substance, to
decide if regulatory action is necessary to prevent an unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment. 77 TSCA authorizes EPA to
extend this ninety-day review period, thereby postponing manufacture
and processing of the chemical upon a showing of good cause.78
Otherwise, a manufacturer or processor may commence use of the
chemical substance upon the expiration of the initial ninety-day re-
view period.79 Exemption from premanufacture regulation is avail-
able for chemical substances used for research, development, and test
marketing, and for substances EPA has determined will not present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.80
V. TSCA AND FEDERALISM
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power "to regulate commerce . . . among the several
states."'1 Therefore, Congress has the power to regulate chemicals
traveling in the stream of interstate commerce,8 2 and any state law
74. Id. § 2604(f)(1); see also Hathaway et al., supra note 59, at 1209-13.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(9).
76. Id. §§ 2604(a) (1) (B), 2604(a) (2).
77. Id. § 2604(a).
78. Id. § 2604(c). EPA may seek an extension under this section in order to obtain
additional information about, and permit further review of, chemical substances that may
present a § 2604(a)(2) risk. Hathaway et al., supra note 59, at 10,216. Reasons for the
extension must be published in the Federal Register. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(c).
79. Hathaway et al., supra note 59, at 10,216.
80. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h).
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
82. Cf Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress may regulate
any activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce). In Unites States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), the Supreme Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause powers. Id. at 1633-34. The Lopez decision,
however, does not affect the broad Commerce Clause powers enjoyed by Congress in the
realm of economic legislation. See id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "stare
decisis operates with great force in counseling us not to call in question ... congressional
power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature").
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conflicting with this exercise of congressional power is unconstitu-
tional by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. 83 Moreover, because of the
need for uniformity in interstate trade standards, the Commerce
Clause also prohibits state regulation of interstate trade even where
Congress has not legislated.8 4 Although the Constitution severely re-
stricts the states' power to regulate chemical manufacture, there are
two means by which the states constitutionally can regulate chemicals.
First, states have the power to regulate the disposal of chemicals
within their borders.85 Second, and perhaps more significantly, states
can regulate commerce to the extent authorized by congressional leg-
islation, even if the Commerce Clause would prohibit state regulation
in the absence of such enabling legislation.86
While many environmental programs are intended to operate in
conjunction with state laws, and therefore expressly permit state envi-
ronmental regulation, 87 TSCA does not promote an integrated rela-
tionship between federal and state regulatory authorities.
Accordingly, section 18 of TSCA prohibits states from being signifi-
cant regulators of the manufacture and use of chemical substances.88
The preemption provision of TSCA states specifically:
[I]f the Administrator prescribes a rule or order under sec-
tion 2604 or 2605 of this title no State or political subdivision
of a State may, after the effective date of such requirement,
establish or continue in effect any requirement which is ap-
plicable to such substance or mixture, or an article contain-
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ...
shall be the supreme law of the land . . ").
84. See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1890) ("[I]nasmuch as interstate com-
merce ... is national in its character, and must be governed by a uniform system, so long as
Congress does not pass any law to regulate it, or allowing the States so to do, it thereby
indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and untrammelled.").
85. Cf Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (holding that state
prohibitions on plastic milk containers did not violate the Commerce Clause).
86. See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891) (upholding constitutionality of statute permit-
ting states to regulate liquor in interstate commerce when the liquor physically was present
in that state).
87. For instance, the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), allows
states to administer and enforce their own EPA-approved permit programs incorporating
the limitations set by EPA. Michele M. Miller, Note, Environmental Law--Federal Preeraption
of Local PCB Ordinance under the Toxic Substances Control Act-Rollins Environmental Services
(FS), Inc., v. Parish of St.James, 35 U. KAN. L Rzv. 461, 464 n.29 (1987). While EPA sets
minimum standards, states can set specific permit limitations, with violations of state per-
mit programs being enforced by EPA or the state. Id.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). In effect, the preemption clause prohibits state regulation
after EPA concludes regulation under its testing, notice, or TSCA § 6 "regulation of mix-
tures" provisions.
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ing such substance or mixture, and which is designed to
protect against such risk .... 89
There are three methods by which states can escape TSCA pre-
emption. TSCA does not preempt state law identical to EPA's rule,
state laws enacted under the authority of another federal law, or state
laws completely prohibiting the use of a chemical within that state.9"
Furthermore, even if a state law does not fall into one of these three
exceptions, EPA may, by rule, exempt state laws from TSCA preemp-
tion when the law is significantly more protective of health and the
environment and provided the state law does not burden interstate
commerce unduly.91 TSCA's preemption provision has been criti-
cized in that section 18 states a general rule of nonpreemption, but
then obscures that principle through myriad exceptions.92
Although TSCA limits state power in the name of federal uni-
formity, in some instances TSCA allows state law to limit the reach of
federal regulation. For example, TSCA authorizes EPA to regulate
the disposal of hazardous chemicals, including PCBs. Section 6 states
that EPA can prohibit or otherwise regulate "any manner or method
of disposal of such substance or mixture, or of any article containing
such substance or mixture, by its manufacturer or processor or by any
other person who uses, or disposes of, it for commercial purposes."98
EPA's disposal regulations, however, may not violate any state or local
requirements.9 4
89. Id. § 2617(a) (2) (B).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 2617(b).
92. One eminent commentator has noted:
The basic design of Section 18 of TSCA is nonpreemptive, with qualified invita-
tions to states and political subdivisions to regulate disposal or impose bans even
in the presence of an EPA initiative on the subject matter. There is an exception
for the testing rules that are explicitly made preemptive, and one can sympathize
with the desire to keep intact federally designed testing regimens that represent a
consensus of professional scientific opinion. Section 18 also is highly convoluted,
in ways that make mute the no-preemption message, and it contains an exemp-
tion procedure that suggests inferentially that local government is expected to
beat a path to EPA's door to ask whether the latest ordinance will survive a federal
test of acceptability.
3 WiLa,,m H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 6.11 (1988).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (6) (A).
94. Id. § 2605(a) (6) (B). Specifically, TSCA provides that EPA
may not require any person to take any action which would be in violation of any
law or requirement of, or in effect for, a State or political subdivision, and shall
require each person subject to it to notify each State and political subdivision in
which a required disposal may occur of such disposal.
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Therefore, section 6(a) (6) (A) and (B) may be understood as a
federalism compromise. It allows the federal government to regulate
the manufacturing and processing of chemical substances, and
thereby ensuring national uniformity, while deferring to the states on
disposal of these chemical substances. This facilitates the flow of in-
terstate commerce, while allowing the states to protect their residents
from the dangers associated with the improper disposal of chemicals.
Beyond states' right to regulate chemical disposal, TSCA makes
other federalism compromises that return to the states powers ceded
to the federal government by the Commerce Clause. The many ex-
ceptions to federal preemption contained in section 18 all reflect con-
gressional recognition that state regulation should prevail over federal
uniformity in some cases.95
Judicial interpretation of TSCA preemption has been inconsis-
tent, both in analysis and result. In Farley-Northwest Industries, Inc. v.
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,96 the plaintiffs specifi-
cally alleged that the NJDEP's cleanup standards were preempted by
TSCA. The court noted that federal courts were split as to whether
PCB regulation under TSCA9 7 preempted state regulation of PCBs.98
Nevertheless, the court held that the state regulation was not pre-
empted by TSCA, noting that "Congress intended to allow states and
localities some leeway to approve more stringent PCB disposal regula-
tions than those established by the EPA."9 9
In Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. v. Township of Logan,"°° the
issue was whether a locality was precluded by state or federal law from
placing PCBs in areas locally designated as environmentally sensi-
tive.101 The state superior court held that the Logan Township ordi-
95. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
96. No. A-2037-89T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 5, 1991).
97. The Far/ey court was referring to EPA's subsequent promulgation under TSCA of
regulations for the disposal of PCBs. Id. at 12 (citing 40 C.F.R1 § 761.1 to .218).
98. Id. at 12-13.
99. Id.
100. 488 A.2d 258 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984), rev'd, 508 A.2d 271 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986) (reversal based solely on state preemption of local PCB disposal
ordinances).
101. Id. at 259. PCBs are used as cooling liquids in electrical conductors. The only toxic
substances specifically addressed in TSCA are PCBs. Because of their extreme toxicity, and
their pervasive and persistent presence in the environment, PCBs are considered carcino-
gens and dangerous to human health. SeeWilliam L. Andreen, Defusing the "Not In My Back
Yard" Syndrome: An Approach to Federal Preemption of State and Local Impediments to the Siting of
PCB Disposal Facilities, 63 N.C. L. REv. 811 nn.3-5 (1985). TSCA's regulatory scheme pro-
vides specific requirements and restrictions on all aspects of PCB regulation. Under 15
U.S.C. § 2605(c), EPA promulgates regulations prescribing the disposal and labelling of
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nance was not preempted by federal law.' Although the state
appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that state law pre-
empted local regulation of PCBs, it did not disturb the trial court's
finding of an absence of federal preemption.10 3 Similarly, in Chappell
v. SCA Services, Inc.,' 04 a federal district court held that TSCA does not
preempt state laws relating to the disposal of chemical substances, in-
cluding PCBs.'t 5
The Fifth Circuit, however, has construed TSCA section 18 to pre-
empt state and local PCB disposal bans. In Rollins Environmental Serv-
ices (FS), Inc. v. Parish of St. James,'1 6 the Fifth Circuit found that under
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Congress
"may, within constitutional limits, absolutely preempt state and local
rulemaking authority in a given area."1 0 7 Furthermore, the court
stated that even if Congress had not absolutely preempted an area,
Congress still may preempt state action where state or local laws con-
flict with or are obstacles to the execution and accomplishment of
congressional legislation.10 8
Rollins Environmental Services (FS), Inc. v. Parish of St. James involved
a local ordinance that severely restricted PCB disposal.' 09 The plain-
tiff argued that the local ordinance violated the Supremacy Clause;
110
the district court dismissed the suit due to lack of subject matter juris-
diction."1 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the plaintiff and held that
PCBs. EPA can also prohibit the manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce,
and use of PCBs under certain conditions. Id.
102. 488 A.2d at 260. The court reasoned that the town's ordinance was within the
language provided by 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (6). The court also examined whether the
town's ordinance was preempted by state law. Id. at 261. The court determined that, while
states have the power to override local authority in the regulation of PCBs, the state had
not done so.
103. Rollins EnvtL Servs., 508 A.2d at 272-73.
104. 540 F. Supp. 1087 (C.D. Ill. 1982).
105. Id. at 1098-99. Trost notes that the Chappell court "relied heavily on EPA's then
current opinion that state and local laws regulating, but not necessarily banning, PCB dis-
posal were not pre-empted. This issue came up in the context of whether TSCA pre-
empted state tort actions, which the court held it did not." Trost, supra note 19, at n.134.
106. 775 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1985).
107. Id. at 634.
108. Id.
109. IL at 630. The ordinance, entitled "An Ordinance Regulating Hazardous Wastes
and PCBs in St. James Parish," provided that "the treatment, storage, and disposal of
[PCBs] at commercial waste disposal facilities within the Parish of Saint James is hereby
prohibited." Id.
110. Id. Because the locality was concerned with the potential constitutional challenge
to its original ordinance banning PCB disposal, it rescinded the original ordinance and
enacted an alternative ordinance which was designed to regulate commercial solvent clean-
ing businesses.
111. Id. at 631.
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PCB disposal regulations were only to be issued pursuant to TSCA
section 6(e)(1), the specific provision allowing EPA to promulgate
regulations governing PCB waste disposal.' 2 Because the local ordi-
nance either prohibited or unduly burdened PCB disposal, TSCA, in
conjunction with the Supremacy Clause, preempted the local
ordinance."3
This court ruling treats TSCA as preempting local regulation of
PCB disposal and, aside from the exception set out in section 18, any
local or state law on PCB disposal would be a violation of the Com-
merce Clause."I4 The Rollins v. Parish of St. James rationale has been
criticized as
misread[ing] Subsection 18(b) as imposing a preclearance
regime for state or local bans and steer[ing] a meticulous
course through the language of Subsection 18(a) to discover
a local authority to regulate the disposal of any chemical sub-
stance other than PCBs. The court was inclined to resist the
"not-in-my-backyard" syndrome, but was hard put to discover
preemption absolutism in Section 18.11' 5
Several district courts have passed on the constitutionality of local
PCB disposal bans; unfortunately, there has been no consensus as to
whether TSCA preempts such local regulation." 6 To harmonize
these conflicting holdings and rationales, courts have focused on
which environmental statute the locality has used in enacting its PCB
disposal ban." 7 For example, a North Carolina district court held
112. Id. at 636; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1).
113. Rollins EnvtL Serms., 775 F.2d at 636-37.
114. Id. at 635.
115. 3 RODGERS, supra note 92, § 6.11.
116. Trost, supra note 19, at 127; see also Chappell v. SCA Servs., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 1087,
1097-99 (C.D. Il. 1982); Twitty v. North Carolina, 527 F. Supp. 778, 781 (E.D.N.C. 1981)
(explaining that TSCA "preempts any local ordinance"), afid, 696 F.2d 992 (4th Cir.
1982); Sed, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 979, 991 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (holding that
there is no preemption of disposal requirements).
117. 3 RODGERS, supra note 92, § 6.11.
Section 18 appears in the case law as one implement among many put to service
in pursuit of a preemption strategy, and as a fleeting proposition in ongoing judi-
cial struggles over hazardous waste management choices. As always, the preemp-
tion decisions show the wide mood shifts of the courts, particularly in the options
to proceed by hard look or deferential glance, and the assumptions to view the
measure attacked in isolation or as the first manifestation of a trend. The local
laws most likely to survive preemption objections are those related to personal injuy claims.
These include nuisance claims, actions for indemnity and restitution, cleanup initiatives,
and confrontations over citizens attempts to learn about the isks.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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that the local ordinance violated TSCA's PCB preemption clause, stat-
ing rhetorically that
it is clear that Congress intended to give states and localities
some leeway to impose more stringent disposal requirements
than those provided for by federal regulation. However, the
issue for determination here is whether Congress intended
to confer upon counties and other local governments the au-
thority to totally frustrate the PCB disposal program through
the implementation of total disposal bans.""
Some courts have upheld a local PCB disposal ban because the
locality enacted the ban under other federal laws. The most common
examples are local ordinances enacted under the Clean Water Act,
where the locality passed the ordinance in order to prevent water pol-
lution by PCB disposal.119
This myriad of arguably conflicting cases demonstrates that TSCA
does not necessarily provide complete preemption on PCB disposal
nor do the states or localities enjoy the power to ban PCB disposal.
[T] he legislative history of TSCA demonstrates that Congress
intended the federal PCB disposal rule to set minimum stan-
dards for safe disposal, thereby preempting by implication
less stringent state and local requirements. Congress, how-
ever, preserved the power of state and local governments to
tailor more stringent requirements that are consistent with
the goal of safe disposal. Nevertheless, total bans-and
those requirements that impose practically unattainable con-
ditions, resulting in constructive bans-obstruct the national
goal of safely disposing of PCBs; consequently, they ordina-
rily are preempted by implication. Such bans, constructive
or actual, may be saved from preemption only when they
serve to ensure safe PCB disposal. Realistically, therefore, a
ban may be given effect only on a showing that some unique
local geological or physical condition justifies a ban on safety
grounds. 12°
This approach is the most rational manner of analyzing the ambigui-
ties of TSCA's PCB disposal regulations. Courts continue to strain to
find the congressional intent behind the PCB disposal clause in TSCA
but
[u] nfortunately the compiled legislative history of the TSCA
does not clearly indicate whether Congress intended that lo-
118. Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 289 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
119. See Twitty, 527 F. Supp. at 781; Sed, 519 F. Supp. at 991.
120. Andreen, supra note 101, at 815.
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cal PCB disposal requirements be expressly preempted by
section [18] of the TSCA. In fact, the relationship of the
specific PCB requirement of section [6(e)], with the more
general disposal requirements of section [6(a) (6)] and the
statutory preemption clause, was not addressed at any point
in the legislative reports or debates. 121
VI. STATE REGULATION OF Toxic SUBSTANCES
In addition to TSCA's regulation of toxic substances, several fed-
eral environmental laws have been used to address industrial chemical
concerns.1 22 While NewJersey has regulated toxic substances through
these federal programs, NewJersey accomplishes most of its toxic sub-
stance regulation objectives through the recendy enacted Pollution
Prevention Act (PPA).' 2 s The New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection, working with industry, developed regulations that
require industry to file a pollution prevention plan with the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection. The regulations require indus-
tries in New Jersey using significant amounts of chemicals and solvents
to review their operations carefully and prepare a first-phase plan
within eighteen months of the Act's effective date.
1 24
PPA requires businesses to review their plant operation process to
achieve maximum efficiency and to reduce environmental violations.
The overlap between the prevention plans of TSCA and PPA are lim-
ited to that of minimizing waste and preventing environmental and
occupational hazards. Ideally, TSCA will regulate the actual manufac-
turing and processing of chemical substances while PPA will regulate
the business plans involved in preparing for manufacturing and
processing chemical substances. The increase in regulation and com-
121. Miller, supra note 87, at 474 (foomotes omitted).
122. In general, the Clean Air Act is meant to "protect and enhance air quality to pro-
mote public health and welfare." The Clean Water Act restores and maintains "the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters"; the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act regulates "the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and dispo-
sal of hazardous wastes"; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act finances "cleanup measures for releases of hazardous substances and leaking
hazardous waste dumps"; the Occupational Safety and Health Act allows the development
and enforcement of "mandatoryjob safety and health standards to ensure as far as possible
that employees have safe and healthful working conditions"; the Safe Drinking Water Act
protects "the quality of all sources of drinking water;" the Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act regulates "the dumping of materials into oceans and prevent[s] or
strictly limit[s] the dumping of material that adversely affects human health or the marine
environment"; and the Consumer Product Safety Act protects "the public against unrea-
sonable risks of injury associated with consumer products." GAO, supra note 1, at 64.
123. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-35 (West 1991).
124. Id. § 13:lD-40(b).
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pliance costs from the potential expansion of TSCA and with the crea-
tion of PPA should be offset by limiting the response costs from spills
and other environmental violations.
While these plans are not duplicative, they might raise future pre-
emption issues, especially if Congress expands the scope of TSCA. For
instance, the NewJersey Appellate Division recently upheld the pollu-
tion prevention regulations against a challenge by the Chemical In-
dustry Council of New Jersey."2 5 The Chemical Industry Council
argued that the regulations, which were designed to reduce the gener-
ation of toxic substances, were invalid because they exceeded the au-
thority granted by the New Jersey legislature under PPA and,
therefore, were arbitrary and unreasonable.'26 The Appellate Divi-
sion found that such challenges were either meritless or rendered
moot by the Department of Environmental Protection's 1994 amend-
ments to the regulations.1" 7
Therefore, if TSCA and PPA are to protect the public by provid-
ing an exhaustive and comprehensive regulation of the chemical in-
dustry, while at the same time encouraging commerce by avoiding
duplication and inefficiency, state and federal agencies must acknowl-
edge their overlap and allow one regulation to control. Specifically,
the reporting and pollution planning requirements of PPA should ful-
fill chemical industries' reporting requirements under TSCA. Simi-
larly, the confidentiality provision of TSCA should apply to the
information provided under PPA. In other words, reporting the use
of chemical substances to a state agency should effectuate the report-
ing of that chemical substance to the federal agency, and that report-
ing under PPA should enjoy the benefits of TSCA confidentiality.
VII. CONCLUSION
During TSCA's 1976 congressional hearings, Congress recog-
nized the competing federal and state interest at each phase of the
product's life cycle. Because of concerns over interstate commerce,
Congress generally has preempted states in all phases of TSCA regula-
tion except for disposal. TSCA was meant to create distinctions in
health, safety and commerce issues during the manufacture, distribu-
tion, use and disposal of toxic substances. States are able to govern
disposal issues within state boundaries and are allowed to enact addi-
125. In reAdoption of N.JA.C. 7:1K, No. A-3915-92t5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 4,
1994).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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tional testing requirements if such requirements do not "unduly bur-
den" interstate commerce. States also have the ability to ban the use
of any chemical substance within the state.
TSCA presents an interesting balance of federal and state inter-
ests. With the growth of the chemical industry, and through emerg-
ing technologies, TSCA and its regulations will continue to expand.
Environmental practitioners must be prepared to deal with TSCA's
comprehensive regulatory and testing processes and understand their
applications on state and local entities.
